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Case No. 20110027-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
FERNANDO GONZALEZ CAMARGO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for possession of methamphetamine, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 
Supp. 2009), and receiving stolen property, a class B misdemeanor. This Court 
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for 
possession of methamphetamine? 
Standard of Review. "The standard of review for a sufficiency claim is 
highly deferential to the jury verdict." State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, | 29,122 
P.3d 639. The appellate court "beginfs] by reviewing 'the evidence and all 
inferences which may be reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the verdict." Id. (citation omitted). The Court "will reverse a jury verdict only if 
[it] determine^] that 'reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict/" Id. 
(citation omitted). 
2. Was testimony about a Utah State University incident report that a 
laptop computer was stolen inadmissible hearsay? 
Standard of Review. "In reviewing the admissibility of hearsay, legal 
questions are reviewed for correctness while the ultimate ruling on admissibility 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, [^16, 
256 P.3d 1102, cert denied, 263 P.3d 390 (Utah 2011); accord State v. Workman, 2005 
UT 66, Tf 10,122 P.3d 639. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutory provisions and rule are reproduced in Addendum 
A: Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2009); Utah R. Evid. 801; Utah 
R. Evid. 803. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of proceedings. 
After a warrant-based search of his apartment, Defendant was charged 
with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony; receiving stolen property having a value of $5,000 or more, a second 
degree felony; and possession of a weapon by a restricted person, a third degree 
felony. Rl-3,92-94. However, at the close of the State's case at trial, the district 
court found no evidence of an intent to distribute or of the value of the stolen 
property. R346:125-26. Accordingly, it submitted the case to the jury on the 
charges of (1) possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony; 
(2) receiving stolen property, a class B misdemeanor; and (3) possession of a 
weapon by a restricted person, a second degree felony. See R226-28; R346:126. 
The jury found Defendant guilty of counts I and II, but not guilty of count III. 
R182-83,232-35,259. 
Following his verdict, Defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment on 
count I, possession of methamphetamine. R241-50. After hearing argument, the 
district court denied the motion in a signed Minute Entry and Order. R291-94 
(Addendum B). After receiving an amended presentence investigation report, 
the court sentenced Defendant to a suspended prison term of zero-to-five years 
on count I, possession of methamphetamine, and to a suspended jail term of 180 
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days on count II, receiving stolen property. R298. The court placed Defendant 
on supervised probation for 36 months and ordered that he serve 365 days in jail 
with the possibility of early release upon Defendant's completion of the "CATS" 
program. R298-300. Defendant timely appealed. R301-02. 
On December 14,2010, Defendant was released from jail and transferred 
to the custody of the U.S. Marshall pending deportation to Guatemala for being 
in the United States illegally. R307-08. The district court thereafter terminated 
Defendant's probation and issued a $50,000 cash-only bench warrant for his 
arrest should he return to the United States illegally. R308. 
B. Summary of Facts. 
On September 29, 2009, Utah Attorney General (UAG) agents from the 
special investigations and strike force units conducted surveillance of an 
apartment fourplex in Salt Lake City. R345:115-17,200-03,202,208. During their 
surveillance, agents observed "[h]eavy traffic patterns to and from" the two 
upstairs apartments. R345:118,120-21,124,201. They saw numerous people 
make short-term visits, arriving by foot, bike, and car. See R345:201-02. Some, 
carrying backpacks, entered the residence and left shortly after without the 
backpacks. R345:202. Others drove up to the curb and were met by someone 
from one of the upstairs apartments. R345:202. Agent Brendan Call "saw what 
appeared. . . to be two hand-to-hand drug transactions." R345:118,158. And, at 
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various times, someone emerged from the apartment as an apparent lookout, 
walking the neighborhood with a cell phone in hand. R345:118-19,202-03. 
Search of Defendant's Apartment 
Sometime after 10:00 that same evening, UAG agents met with members 
of the Salt Lake City SWAT team at a nearby staging area to coordinate the 
execution of a search warrant for the south (B) and north (D) upstairs 
apartments. See R345:121-24,208-09,226. Close to midnight, the SWAT team 
entered the apartments on the no-knock warrant to secure the premises. 
R345:121-23,159,209,248-49. UAG agents monitored their entry from positions 
outside of the residence, and Agent Call listened to their activities by radio. 
R345:123-24,209. In all, the SWAT team removed fourteen people from the 
apartments, including Defendant and his girlfriend. See R345:130,135,159-
60,171-72,226-27,249,253. 
After the SWAT team escorted the occupants outside, UAG Agent Ed 
Spann directed many of them to sit down on the street curb. R345:226-29,250-
51,260. During this time, Defendant told Agent Spann that he lived in the 
upstairs north apartment and asked that someone explain to him what was 
going on. R345:228-29,258-59; R346:24. He said that he lived there with his 
girlfriend and was concerned about her well-being. R345:229-30. Once the 
apartment was cleared, the SWAT team brought in a drug-detection dog to 
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sweep the apartment for the presence of narcotics. R345:165-67. When the 
SWAT team was finished at approximately 1:00 a.m., Agents Spann and Stephen 
Metcalf led the U AG search team into the two apartments to conduct the search 
for evidence. S^R345:123,129,159-60,171,190,205,209. 
Apartment D was comprised of a living room, a kitchen and dining area, a 
hallway and bathroom, and two bedrooms. R345:124-25,170,203-04. The 
northwest bedroom included a sofa chair, a small dresser, a computer desk, and 
a single bed. See R345:125,174,239; DVD3:03-5:05 (SE4). Agents found both 
men's and women's clothing in the bedroom, as well as some children's clothing 
with the store tags still attached. R345:125-26,174-75,205; DVD3:48-56. In a lock 
box on the floor next to the bed, agents found nine baggies of 
methamphetamine, a meth pipe, and some money. R345:125-27,154,161-62,174-
75,191,204-05,239; DVD4:26-31; R346:31,53-54. The agents also found a variety of 
electronics strewn throughout the room, including numerous laptop 
computers — some in bags, car stereo components, several cameras, two video 
recorders, and four cell phones. R345:128,174,177-78,181,205-06; DVD3:03-
5:05,9:22-29.1 The cell phones rang repeatedly throughout the search. 
1
 Agents also found computers in the living room, a social security card in 
the toilet, and a torn up social security card in the bathtub. R346:17. 
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R345:205,235. Finally, agents found a loaded, sawed-off shotgun in the closet. 
R345:127-28,153,155,162,205,238. 
During the course of the search for evidence, agents brought Defendant 
and his girlfriend back inside Apartment D and seated them on the living room 
couch. R345:130. As Agents Spann and Leo Lucy were carrying laptop 
computers out of the northwest bedroom to the kitchen for processing, 
Defendant asked what they were doing with his computers. R345:207,232,245, 
260. Absent any inquiry from the agents, Defendant asserted that "they weren't 
stolen" and claimed that he repaired them for people. R345:207-08,232,253-
54,257,260-61; R346:21,100-01. However, the agents did not find customer lists 
or receipts, computer manuals, computer repair tools, or any business cards 
with Defendant's name in the apartment. R345:128-29,184,206-07,235. 
Defendant's girlfriend also asked that agents retrieve something from her purse 
in the northwest bedroom. R346:87-88,92. 
Seized Property Determined to be Stolen 
One of the laptops seized from the northwest bedroom was affixed with a 
Utah State University sticker. R345:178-79; R346:46-47; SE4. A UAG agent later 
contacted Detective Kim Ellis of the University police department and provided 
him with the make, model, and serial number of the computer. R346:36-
37,40,47-48. Detective Ellis reviewed University records showing that the laptop 
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was reported missing in August 2009. See R346:37,40-41,44-45,50. Detective 
Ellis also called the University's equipment manager, Deb McGill, and provided 
her with the information on the laptop computer. R346:46-48. Detective Ellis 
then notified the UAG agent that the laptop was University property. R346:48. 
The State also introduced evidence that Officer Robert Gwynn of the 
, North Salt Lake City Police Department took a stolen property report of a laptop 
on September 13,2009. R346:65. The complainant subsequently notified Officer 
Gwynn that he had been contacted by an officer from the Utah Attorney 
General's Office. R346:65. Two and a half months after the search, one of the 
computers seized from the apartment was returned to John Amtoft. R345:134. 
When Agent Stephen Metcalf, who processed the evidence at the scene, 
inventoried one of the cell phones, he noticed that it had a photograph of his 
neighbor's daughter on it. R345:182-83. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Sufficiency of the evidence. Because Defendant was not in actual 
possession of the methamphetamine, the State was required to demonstrate 
constructive possession, i.e., he had both the power and intent to exercise 
dominion and control over the drug. The evidence at trial were sufficient to 
establish the necessary nexus between Defendant and the drugs. Defendant 
admitted that he lived in the apartment and that his bedroom was the one where 
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the drugs were found. Defendant was present in the apartment when officers 
executed the search warrant. Although he apparently shared the room with his 
girlfriend, the bedroom was dominated by items to which he claimed a right to 
(computers) or which were male-related. And finally, the lock box containing 
the methamphetamine was found on the floor next to the bed, along with two 
computers. This evidence established the necessary nexus to show constructive 
possession. This Court should thus affirm Defendant's conviction for 
possession of methamphetamine. 
II. Hearsay. The State concedes that admission of Detective Ellis' 
testimony that a seized computer was stolen, which was based on a police 
incident report, was prejudicial error. Accordingly, the State agrees that the case 
should be remanded for a new trial on the charge of receiving stolen property. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S 
VERDICT THAT DEFENDANT UNLAWFULLY POSSESSED 
METHAMPHET AMINE 
At the close of the State's case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on 
the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for 
possession of methamphetamine. R346:lll-12,123. The trial court denied the 
motion and the jury thereafter found Defendant guilty. R346:125-26. Thereafter, 
Defendant again argued that the evidence was insufficient in a motion to arrest 
the judgment. See R241-50,269-77. The court also denied that motion. See R291-
93 (Addendum B). Defendant challenges this ruling on appeal. See Aplt Brf. at 
15-30. Contrary to Defendant's claim, the evidence was sufficient to support the 
jury's verdict and this Court should thus affirm. 
* * * 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence from a jury verdict, this 
Court "accord[s] high deference to the fact-finder at trial/' State v. Hamilton, 
2003 UT 22, Tf 38, 70 P.3d 111. The Court thus "review[s] the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in a light most favorable to the 
verdict." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1212 (Utah 1993). It "'do[es] not weigh 
conflicting evidence/ nor [does it] 'substitute [its] judgment for that of the fact-
finder.'" Id. at ^ 38 (citations omitted). If there is conflicting evidence, the Court 
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"must 'accept that version of events7" which supports the verdict. See People v. 
Maury, 68 P.3d 1, 30 (Cal. 2003) (citation omitted). This Court "will reverse a 
criminal conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that 'reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the crime/' State 
v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). 
In this case, Defendant was tried for "knowingly and intentionally ... 
possessing].. . a controlled substance/' in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2009). The State was thus required to establish that 
Defendant was either in "actual physical possession" or in "constructive 
possession" of the baggies of methamphetamine found in the lock box in the 
bedroom he shared with his girlfriend. See State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318-19 
(Utah 1985). 
A person is said to be in "constructive possession" of an object when he or 
she does not have actual physical possession of the item, but nevertheless has 
"both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over [it]." Fox, 
709 P.2d at 319. Typically, the doctrine of constructive possession is used to 
establish possession of drugs found in a location occupied by multiple people. 
See, e.g. State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66,122 P.3d 639 (finding live-in girl friend to 
be in constructive possession of meth lab in apartment where she and her 
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boyfriend lived). The doctrine is also used in cases where the defendant is 
absent or separated from the place where the drugs are found. See, e.g. Fox, 709 
P.2d 316 (finding owner/occupant to be in constructive possession of marijuana 
growing at home even though he was no longer there). 
When drugs are found on a defendant's person, the fact of physical 
possession is direct evidence of the defendant's "power and intent to exercise 
dominion and control over the drug." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. But when the 
defendant does not have actual physical possession, the State must demonstrate 
that "the drugs were subject to the defendant's dominion and control and the 
defendant had the intent to exercise that control." State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, \ 
16, 985 P.2d 911. To do so, the State must rely on other facts to establish "the 
necessary nexus" between the defendant and the contraband. Spanish Fork City 
v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, \ 10, 975 P.2d 501. 
"Whether a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug exists 
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. 
Factors that may be relevant in determining possession "include[e] ownership 
and/or occupancy of the residence or vehicle where the drugs were found, 
presence of defendant at the time [the] drugs were found, defendant's proximity 
to the drugs, previous drug use, incriminating statements or behavior, [and] 
presence of drugs in a specific area where the defendant had control." Workman, 
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2005 UT 66, 1| 32. These considerations, however, "are not 'universally 
pertinent/" and the list is not exhaustive. Id. (quoting Layman, 1999 UT 79, ^f 
14-15). A review of the record in this case reveals that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury's finding of possession. 
First, the methamphetamine was found in the northwest bedroom of 
Apartment D. R345:125-27,154,161-62,174-75,191,204-05,239; DVD4:26-31; 
R346:31,53-54. At the scene, Defendant admitted to UAG agents that he lived in 
the apartment with his girlfriend, R345:228-29, and specifically indicated to the 
agents when he was inside that the northwest bedroom was his, R345:233-34. 
Second, Defendant was in the apartment when officers entered to conduct the 
search. See R345:130,172,227-28,248-49. Third, and contrary to Defendant's 
claim on appeal, see Aplt. Brf. 26,29, the northwest bedroom was dominated by 
his possessions and effects, not his girlfriend's. It is true that some items 
belonging to a woman were in the bedroom—a purse next to the door, see 
DVD3:34-38; some women's clothing in the closet, see DVD3:47-4:18; and two 
jewelry boxes on the bed — though it is not clear whether they contained men's 
or women's jewelry, see DVD4:32-40. Otherwise, however, the room was 
cluttered with computers —which Defendant admitted were his — electronic 
parts, tools, and other items typically associated with men. See DVD3:03-5:05. 
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Moreover, Agent Metcalf, who with Agent Spann, was the first to enter 
the apartment after it was cleared, testified that the lock box containing the 
methamphetamine was found on the floor next to the mattress. See 
R345:171,191. And a review of the video shows that two of the laptop 
computers were also on the floor next to the bed — one at the side of the bed and 
the other at the foot of the bed. See DVD4:44-54. This fact further supports the 
inference that the lock box, and the items therein, were Defendant's. See 
Workman, 2005 UT 66, [^34 (recognizing that the intermingling of personal items 
with contraband is a factor supporting a finding of constructive possession). 
Defendant argues that the location of the lock box cannot be certain, 
because the SWAT team, none of whom testified, entered the room first to clear 
the area and to conduct a drug sniff by the canine unit. See Aplt. Brf. at 15. 
However, Agent Call testified that the SWAT team "do[es]n't search [for items] 
at all/' but act to secure the residence for safety reasons. R345:122. Although 
the team conducted a drug sniff, nothing in the record suggests that they moved 
any items. 
In sum, the evidence at trial provided "a sufficient nexus between 
[Defendant] and the drug to permit an inference that [he] had both the power 
and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug/7 Fox, 709 P.2d at 
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319. Accordingly, this Court should affirm Defendant's conviction for 
possession of methamphetamine. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED HEARSAY 
TESTIMONY THAT THE LAPTOP COMPUTER WAS STOLEN 
AND DEFENDANT IS THUS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL 
FOR RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY 
In establishing that the seized laptop computer with a Utah State 
University sticker on it was stolen, the State relied on the testimony of Officer 
Kim Ellis of the Utah State University Police Department. See R346:34-51. Over 
the objections of defense counsel, Officer Ellis testified that an incident report 
showed that the subject laptop computer was reported stolen in August 2009. 
See R346:44-45,50. On appeal, Defendant argues that this testimony was 
inadmissible hearsay, meriting a new trial on the charge of receiving stolen 
property. See Aplt. Brf. at 31-39. The State agrees. 
Detective Ellis explained that when a computer is reported stolen from the 
University, his office makes a report of it. See R346:44-45. He testified that 
according to his report, the subject laptop was taken in August of 2009. R34650-
51. This Court has held that as a general rule, "[p]olice reports are not eligible 
for admission under either [the business records or public records exceptions] of 
Rule 803/' State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292,298 (Utah App. 1990). Police records of 
"routine matters/7 such as the date a crime was reported, are an exception to the 
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rule. State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181,1184 (Utah 1983). But police reports of the 
factual events and details of a criminal case "should ordinarily be excluded/' Id. 
at 1184-85. The incident report upon which Detective Ellis relied appears to fall 
within this category. Accordingly, the State concedes that it was error to admit 
this evidence. 
. To merit reversal, Defendant must also show that the error was 
prejudicial, i.e., "that there is 'a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings/ " State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, ^ 23,122 P.3d 639 
(citation omitted). The State concedes that based on the trial record, such a 
likelihood exists and that a new trial is thus warranted on the charge of 
receiving stolen property. 
Because the State concedes that admission of Detective Ellis7 hearsay 
testimony constituted prejudicial error, this Court need not, and should not, 
address Defendant's constitutional claim that admission of the testimony 
violated his right to confrontation. See State v. Nelson, 2007 UT App 34, f^ 15,157 
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P.3d 329 ('"It is a fundamental rule that this court should avoid addressing 
constitutional issues unless required to do so/ ") (citation omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction 
for possession of methamphetamine, but reverse his conviction for receiving 
stolen property and remand the case for anew trial on that charge. 
Respectfully submitted this January 6, 2012. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
>. GRAY 
distant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
2
 Nor should the Court address Defendant's claim that Detective Ellis' 
testimony summarizing the report does not qualify under the hearsay 
exceptions, because testimony is not a record. See Aplt. Brf. at 37 n.3. The claim 
was not preserved below, nor is it necessary to resolution of the case. See 
Gallivan v. Walter, 2002 UT 89, \97, 54 P.3d 1069 (Durham, J., concurring) 
(observing that "courts should generally resolve cases on the narrowest 
applicable grounds unless specific reasons exist for offering broader guidance"). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a) (i) (West Supp. 2009) 
It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or 
use a controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, 
unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, 
directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
Utah R.Evid. 801 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written 
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended 
by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a 
statement 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made 
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
* * # 
Utah R. Evid. 803 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even 
though the declarant is available as a witness: 
* * * 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, 
of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or 
near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person 
with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted 
business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that 
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian 
or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with 
Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, 
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances 
of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term 
"business" as used in this paragraph includes business, 
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institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of 
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
* * * 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, 
or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, 
setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) 
matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which 
matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in 
criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law 
enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings 
and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings 
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority 
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
* * * 
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ADDENDUM B 
Minute Entry and Order 
(filed Nov 18 2010) 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
NOV ! 8 2010 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH SALT LAKfc COUNI ' 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FERNANDO GANZALEZ-CAMARGO, 
Defendant. 
**ML 
Deputy Clerk 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 091907747 
Pending before the court is the defendant Fernando Ganzalez-Camargo's motion for 
Judgement Notwithstanding the Verdict and to Arrest Judgement. The defendant argues that, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, the prosecution failed to 
present sufficient evidence to support a conviction for Possession of Controlled Substance. 
A. Standards for the Court 
Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b) states, "a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to 
have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in 
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict" The grounds for a directed verdict and for a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict are identical and thus a "trial court can enter the judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict only for one reason — the absence of any substantial evidence to 
support the verdict." Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 342 (Utah 1967). A party 
moving for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict "has the very difficult burden of showing no 
evidence exists that raises a question of material fact." Alta Health Strategies, Inc. v. CCI 
^ v 7 ! 
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Mechanical Serv., 930 P.2d 280, 284 (Utah Ct App, 1996). 
The determination of constructive possession of drugs turns on the particular 
circumstances of the case and facts which permit the inference that the accused intended to use 
the drugs as his own. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). To find constructive possession, "it 
is necessary to prove that there was a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug to permit 
an inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control 
over the drug." Workman, 2005 UT 66, ^11, 122 P.3d 639 (Utah 2005) (quoting Fox, 709 P.2d 
at 319). The Utah Supreme Court has listed several factors that may be important in determining 
a sufficient nexus. Factors include "ownership and/or occupancy of the residence . . ., presence 
of defendant at the time drugs were found, defendant's proximity to the drugs, previous drug use, 
incriminating statements or behavior, presence of drugs in a particular area where the defendant 
had control," presence of drug paraphernalia among accused's personal effects, or in a place 
where accused has special control. Workman, 2005 UT 66, ^ [12; Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. When 
taken alone or in a small group these factor may not support a nexus, but the if the cumulative 
effect of the factors is such that a reasonable jury could have concluded that there was a sufficient 
nexus between the drugs and the defendant this court will deny the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the-verdict of the jury. 
B. Analysis 
Applying these standards to the case at hand, there is not an absence of evidence that 
could lead a reasonable jury to find constructive possession. The prosecution presented evidence 
of a nexus between the methamphetamine and the defendant to permit a reasonable jury to infer 
that the defendant had the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drugs. 
The prosecution presented evidence with respect to the defendant's occupancy of the bedroom 
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where the drugs were found, the defendant's presence outside the residence when the raid 
occurred, the proximity of the drugs to defendant's possessions, the defendant's statements, and 
the defendant's behavior. The jury was presented with this evidence and from this the jury found 
a nexus to support an inference of possession. There was not an absence of any substantial 
evidence in this case to set aside the jury's verdict. 
C. Conclusion 
Based on the evidence presented at trial, it was certainly reasonable to infer that 
defendant knew of the drugs and had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over 
the methamphetamine in the northwest bedroom. Defendant's motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict and to Arrest Judgement is denied. 
Date this * day of November, 2010. 
ROYAL I. H\ 
DISTRICT O 
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